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Enforcement Issues: A Practical Overview
Glen D. Nager"
Julia M. Broas"
When Congress enacted the Civil Rights Act of 1991,' legislative protagonists
on all sides claimed victory. Representatives of civil rights groups and the
plaintiffs' bar claimed they had succeeded in obtaining legislation that was
"restorative" in nature-after a series of adverse Supreme Court decisions in
1989-and that would more adequately compensate victims of employment
discrimination and deter wrongdoing.' By contrast, representatives of the Bush
administration and, to a lesser extent, members of the management defense bar,
claimed they had successfully headed off a "quota bill" and defanged a potential
"litigation monster."3 If these protagonists were to be believed, Congress had
enacted sweeping civil rights legislation that, notwithstanding a prior presidential
veto and an incredibly acrimonious legislative debate, required compromise from
neither side and created only legislative winners and no losers.
Of course, self-serving proclamations are par for the course in legislative
debate and, at the time, came as no surprise to disinterested, outside observers. But
questions remained concerning which side actually had compromised and who, if
anyone, had really "won" and "lost" as a result of those compromises. It is those
questions that are sought, at least tentatively, to be addressed in this article.
Copyright 1994, by LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW.
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1. Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991) (codified in various sections of 42 U.S.C. (Supp.
111 1992)).
2. See, e.g., William T. Coleman, Jr. & Vernon E. Jordan, Jr.. How the Civil Rights Bill Was
Really Passed, Wash. Post. Nov. 18, 1991, at A21 (bill "significantly strengthens civil rights
protections"); Bruce Fein, Ti,,e Bombs i Rights Bill, Wash. Times, Nov. 4, 1991, at El (Bush
"outfoxed by the Democratic opposition"); Stuart Taylor, The Civil-Rights Bill: Punt to the Courts,
Legal Times, Nov. 4, 1991, at 25 (White House "cave[d]'in on lawyer's bonanza front" by accepting
jury trial and damages awards provisions).
3. See. e.g., C. Boyden Gray, Civil Rights: We Won, They Capitulated, Wash. Post, Nov. 14,
1991, at A23 ("President Bush did not 'cave' or 'surrender' on quotas in the new civil rights bill."
Bush opposed provisions that would have "exposledl countless employers to ninous litigation and
liability any time their numbers were not 'right.'); White House Announces Civil Rights Compromise
Ending Tivo-Year Long Dispute, 208 Daily Lab. Rep. for Executives (BNA), at A-20 (Oct. 28, 1991)
(Bush denied that his administration retreated: "[Ilt is not a quota bill.... We didn't cave."); 210
Daily Lab. Rep. for Executives (BNA), at D-1 (Oct. 30, 1991) (by dropping "pro-lawyer provisions"
of 1990 bill, 1991 Act represents "a further vindication of the President's resistance to legislation
creating a bonanza for lawyers").
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In doing so, however, an attempt shall be made to avoid reentering the debate
that immediately preceded and followed the Civil Rights Act's enactment. Rather,
the developments in law and practice that have occurred in the wake of the Civil
Rights Act's passage will be examined and compared to the predictions and claims
of the legislative protagonists. The tentative conclusion, based on the results to
date, is, not surprisingly, that both sides made significant compromises and that
neither side can properly claim to be the "winner" of this legislative battle, though
the civil rights groups and representatives of the plaintiffs' bar appear to have a
slight edge. But, because the 1991 Act has greatly exacerbated the substantial
administrative backlog and congestion in the federal court system, the resulting
overload on the civil rights enforcement system may ultimately mean that the Act
works to the detriment of all litigants, particularly civil rights plaintiffs.
Part I of the article examines the developments in law and practice in the two-
year period since passage of the 1991 Act. Part II compares these developments
to the respective predictions and claims of the legislative protagonists and, as stated
above, concludes that neither side can properly claim to have "won" the legislative
battle, though civil rights groups and representatives of the plaintiffs' bar certainly
have scored some early victories. Finally, Part III notes that, because of the
administrative and judicial logjam created by the 1991 Act, this legislation
ultimately may only make "losers" out of many of those that the legislation aimed
to protect.
I. DEVELOPMENTS TO DATE UNDER THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT
First, this article begins with a section-by-section review of developments in
law and practice under the Civil Rights Act. Among other things, this review
reveals that, while the provisions of the bill were heavily debated, thus far there has
been surprisingly little litigation about their meaning.
A. Section 102'
Section 102 of the Act revised prior law by authorizing a plaintiff in a Title
VII case to recover compensatory and punitive damages as a remedy for
intentional discrimination (as opposed to disparate impact), in addition to the
relief traditionally available under Title VIP and the Americans with Disabilities
Act ("ADA").6 The statute places a limit on the amount of total compensatory
and punitive damages that may be awarded to a plaintiff. For an employer with
more than 14 and fewer than 101 employees, the cap is $50,000; for an employer
with more than 100 and fewer than 201 employees, the cap is $100,000; for an
employer with more than 200 and fewer than 501 employees, the cap is
4. Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071. 1072 (1991).
5. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
6. Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. (Supp. V 1993).
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$200,000; and for an employer with more than 500 employees, the cap is
$300,000. In a case in which such damages are sought, either party may demand
a jury trial.
Since the enactment of Section 102, there has been an "explosion" in
charges of employment discrimination filed with the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission. Charge filings are up nearly 45% since 1991.8
Indeed, the fiscal 1993 total of 87,942 charges is the largest in the EEOC's
history, and represents a staggering 21.6% increase from the previous year's
total.9 Although some of the increase is attributable to the passage of the
ADA,' o informed observers have attributed a substantial portion of the increased
filings to the Civil Rights Act's "major new incentives for individuals to sue
their current or former employers.""
Interestingly, however, this increase in charge filing has not yet produced a
corresponding increase in litigation over the meaning and effect of Section 102.
While there has been substantial litigation seeking the damages made available
by Section 102 and about whether Section 102 may be applied retroactively to
conduct or trials that occurred prior to the statute's enactment,' 2 there are only
a few reported decisions addressing interpretive disputes under Section 102 itself.
In U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. AIC Security
Investigations.'3 a federal district court examined the standards for imposing the
statutory caps on compensatory and punitive damages set forth in Section 102(b)
of the Act. Noting that the plain language of the limitations compelled a
reduction of the jury's award of damages to the plaintiff, the court reduced only
the punitive damages portion of the award to meet the limit of the statutory
ceiling. It based this decision on its earlier finding that "the. compensatory
damages award [wals not excessive in light of defendants' behavior, and [wa]s
in line with awards in similar cases."' 4 Consistent with the standard established
in Section 102(b)(1), the court then considered the character of the employer's
conduct in assessing the propriety of the punitive damages determination.
Specifically, it found that the employer's discharge of plaintiff-a fiercely loyal
employee responsible for much of the company's success-in the last months of
his battle with terminal cancer was "outrageous, '" and reflected a "reckless
indifference to his rights and a callous insensitivity to his human condition."' 6
7. Donald R. Livingston, Hard Tines at EEOC Forecast Bad News for Employers and
Employees, I Empl. Disc. Rep. (BNA) 58 (Nov. 3. 1993).
8. Id.
9. 9 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA), at AA-I (Jan. 13, 1994).
10. See 483 Empl. Prac. Rep. (CCH) I I (Dec. 8, 1993) (EEOC receives nearly 1000 new ADA
charges each month).
11. Livingston, supra note 7, at 58.
12. hifra Part If.
13. 823 F. Supp. 571 (N.D. Ill. 1993).
14. Id. at 576.
15. Id. at 579.
16. Id. at 578.
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Notwithstanding these findings, however, the court concluded that a punitive
award ten times greater than the amount of compensatory relief awarded was
excessive and therefore properly reduced pursuant to the statutory limitation.' 7
Significantly, the court found both the corporate and individual defendants jointly
and severally liable for the resulting punitive damages award."8
While this case presents the most significant judicial decision interpreting the
provisions of Section 102, the EEOC and the Internal Revenue Service have been
more active than the courts in its interpretation. Recognizing the potential
significance of these provisions to their enforcement mandates, the two agencies
have issued clarifications or rulings that, for at least the time being, fill
interpretive gaps in the new law.
On July 14, 1992, the EEOC published an Enforcement Guidance on the
availability of compensatory and punitive damages under Section 102 of the 1991
Act. The guidance sets forth the EEOC's intention, in cases where it is pursuing
a claim on behalf of more than one person, to apply the damages caps to each
aggrieved individual. It also provides that, in the agency's view, since relief
traditionally recovered under Title VII is not considered "compensatory," a
complaining party may recoverfully for backpay, interest on back pay, front pay,
and any other relief available under Section 706(g) of Title VII--without
inclusion in the statutory caps. It further outlines various legal parameters and
factors for computing compensatory and punitive damages claims, suggesting that
"[c]ases awarding compensatory and punitive damages under other civil rights
statutes will be used for guidance in analyzing the availability of damages under
Section [102]. [Title 42,] Section 1981 cases are particularly useful because
Congress treated the § [102] damages provisions as an amendment to § 1981 ."20
More recently, the IRS has ruled that damage awards for intentional
discrimination under the 1991 Act and the ADA are nontaxable. In Revenue
Ruling 93-88,2 the IRS based its decision to exclude from gross income all
compensatory damages, including back pay, received in satisfaction of a claim
of disparate treatment gender discrimination under the 1991 Act and racial
discrimination under § 1981 and Title VII on the ground that such damages
constitute relief for personal injury under Section 104(a)(2) of the Internal
Revenue Code.22 The agency also concluded, however, that "back pay received
by a victim of disparate impact discrimination is not excludable from gross
income. 23
17. Id. at 578-79.
18. Id. at 579-80.
19. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (Supp. V 1993).
20. EEOC Enforcement Guidance, 10 n.13 (July 14, 1992). See also EEOC General Counsel
Memorandum (Mar. 1, 1993) (reviewing the agency's litigation position on jury trials, damages,
affirmative action, retroactivity, and after-acquired evidence).
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B. Section 10524
While Section 102 of the Act has produced much activity, but little
interpretive litigation, Section 105 of the Act does not appear to have produced
either. Section 105 addresses the standards that govern proof of disparate impact
claims-the standards that were at issue in the case providing much of the Act's
impetus, Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio.2" Among other things, Section
105 permits a plaintiff to challenge an employer's "decisionmaking process" as
one employment practice if the elements of that process are shown to be
inseparable. It also restates the "business necessity" defense and places upon the
employer the burden of proving that a practice causing disparate impact is "job
related for the position in question and consistent with business necessity."
Although these issues were heavily debated prior to the passage of the Civil
Rights Act, thus far the new law has apparently produced only one issue that has
been the subject of reported litigation.
In Bradley v. Pizzaco of Nebraska, Inc.,26 the Eighth Circuit applied the 1991
Act in determining whether the EEOC was entitled to prospective injunctive relief
which would have required an employer to recognize a medical exception to its no-
beard policy. The EEOC claimed that the policy had a disparate impact upon
African-American males, approximately half of whom apparently suffer from a
skin condition that makes shaving difficult or even impossible. Granting the EEOC
its requested relief, the court first noted that the 1991 Act is meant "'to codify the
concepts of 'business necessity' and 'job related' enunciated by the Supreme Court
in Griggs v. Duke Power Co., and other Supreme Court cases prior to Wards Cove
Packing Co. v. Atonio."'2'  The court then placed the burden of persuasion
regarding these issues upon the employer, requiring it to prove "both a 'compelling
need' for the challenged policy, and the lack of an effective alternative policy that
would not produce a similar disparate impact."28 Noting that this burden "is a
heavy one,"29 the court concluded that the employer had failed to produce
sufficient evidence demonstrating both a compelling need for its policy and that the
"current policy is without workable alternatives or that it has a manifest relationship
to the employment in question."30
That Section 105 has produced few reported litigable issues does not, of
course, necessarily mean that the provision has produced little impact. It could
24. This provision is discussed in greater detail in C. Boyden Gray, Disparate hipact: Histol'y
& Consequences, 54 La. L. Rev. 1487 (1994).
25. 490 U.S. 642, 109 S. Ct. 2115 (1989).
26. 7 F.3d 795 (8th Cir. 1993).
27. Id. at 797.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 798.
30. Id. at 799 (citing Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 91 S. Ct. 849 (1971)). But see
also Fitzpatrick v. City of Atlanta, 2 F.3d H 12 (11 th Cir. 1993) (even under plaintiff-oriented
standards of 1991 Act, city entitled to summary judgment on claim that no-beard policy for
firefighters caused a disparate impact).
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be that the EEOC simply has not processed disparate impact charges under
Section 105, or that interpretive disputes under Section 105 simply are not
arising. But, informal inquiries of the EEOC suggest that this is basically not the
case. Rather, consistent with our own practice experience, while there has been
a substantial increase in the filing of statistics-based cases during the past two
years, government enforcement agencies and plaintiffs' lawyers are, for reasons
that will be discussed later, tending to file these cases as disparate treatment or
"pattern-and-practice" cases, rather than as disparate impact cases under Section
105.
C. Sections 106, 107, and 116"'
There are interesting possibilities for interplay among Sections 106, 107, and
116 of the Act. Each addresses deliberately or potentially the legality of so-
called "benign race" and "gender-conscious" preferences in employment.
Section 106 makes it an unlawful employment practice for an employer "to
adjust the scores of, use different cutoff scores for, or otherwise alter the results
of, employment related tests on the basis of race, religion, sex, or national
origin." Section 107(a) provides that "an unlawful employment practice is
established when the complaining party demonstrates that race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin was a motivating factor for any employment practice, even
though other factors also motivated the practice." Yet, Section 116 provides that
"[n]othing in the amendments made by this title shall be construed to affect
court-ordered remedies, affirmative action, or conciliation agreements, that are
in accordance with the law."
To date, it does not appear that any court has relied on these provisions to
invalidate a time-honored employment selection device-most likely because of
the rule of construction set forth in Section 116. One recent case, however,
involved several of these provisions of the new Act and shows their interrelation-
ship.
In Officers for Justice v. Civil Service Commission,2 the Ninth Circuit
addressed whether an employer's proposal to "band" scores from promotion
examinations violated the 1991 Act or the Constitution. As the court explained,
a "'band' is a statistically derived confidence range that is applied to the
examination results. Differences between scores within the band are considered
to be statistically insignificant due to measurement error inherent in scoring the
examination." 3  The city sought to band certain test scores as a means of
complying with a prior consent decree.34 The district court held that voluntary
"banding" constituted a legally valid scoring procedure because scores within the
31. PUb. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071, 1075-76, 1079 (1991).
32. 979 F.2d 721 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ci. 1645 (1993).
33. Id. at 723.
34. Id.
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band are "substantively equivalent for purpose of the knowledge, skills, and
abilities measured by the- examination. '  Although the court of appeals
declined to reach the plaintiff's challenge to these "banding" procedures under
Section 106 on the ground that plaintiff had failed to raise the issue in its
opening brief, the court did address the interplay of Sections 107 and 116 of the
new law. Specifically noting the "inconsistency" of the plaintiff's reading that
"Congress sought to protect affirmative action in Section 116 while outlawing
it in Section 107," the court concluded that the 1991 Act does not generally alter
existing affirmative action case law.
36
In an interesting footnote in another recent decision, the Ninth Circuit also
alluded to the effect of Section 107 upon the proof required in a "mixed motive"
case. In Washington v. Garrett,37 the court considered numerous claims against
the Navy of unlawful personnel practices and employment discrimination.
Contrasting the necessary proof to be provided by plaintiffs in disparate treatment
and mixed-motive cases, the court noted that "[a] plaintiff need not label her case
a single or mixed motive case from the beginning,"38 but the district court must
decide at "some point in the proceedings, . . . whether a particular case involves
mixed motives. '39 The court ordered the district court on remand to use this
approach.40
D. Section 109 4"
Section 109 of the Act makes Title VII applicable in some circumstances to
employment actions that occur overseas. Among other things, it makes Title VII
applicable to the actions of foreign corporations that are under an American
employer's "control." So far, there are no reported cases interpreting Section
109.
On October 20, 1993, however, the EEOC released an Enforcement
Guidance on Section 109 that addressed, inter alia, the extraterritorial application
of Title VII and the ADA to American and American-controlled employers
abroad. (It also addressed the coverage under both statutes of foreign employers
discriminating within the United States.) The guidance states that the four
factors identified in Section 109(a)(3) for determining "control" of a business
entity are identical to those used by the EEOC in ascertaining when two or more
35. Id. at 722-23.
36. Id. at 725.
37. 10 F.3d 1421 (9th Cir. 1993).
38. Id. at 1432 n.15.
39. Id. (quoting Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 247 n.12, 109 S. Ct. 1775, 1789 n.12
(1989)).
40. See also EEOC Enforcement Guidance (July 14, 1992) (discussing the evaluation of indirect
evidence, direct evidence, and evidence of mixed motives under the disparate treatment theory of
discrimination after the 1991 Act).
41. Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071, 1077 (1991).
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entities may be treated as an "integrated enterprise" or "single employer." Thus,
under the EEOC's view, courts and employers evidently may rely upon the
existing policy guidance and ample authorities interpreting those standards to
determine the existence of American control under new Section 109.42
E. Section 40243
Section 402 of the statute purports to establish the Act's effective date.
Nonetheless, it states only that, "[e]xcept as otherwise specifically provided, this
Act and the amendments made by this Act shall take effect upon enactment."
In striking contrast to the other provisions of the statute, which thus far have not
generated much interpretive dispute, Congress's ambiguity on this critical issue
has created an exceedingly costly litigation logjam. As one district court
presciently predicted, this "tragi-comedy of confusion" has necessitated
"thousands of judicial hours, which Congress could easily have saved.""
Familiar camps have formed in this new litigation battle, following
predictable lines of attack. Spurred by the Act's damages and jury trial
amendment, plaintiffs' attorneys have scrambled to revive dormant cases and
amend complaints in pending litigation to take advantage of the Act's new
remedies. Similarly, management attorneys have prepared for litigation by
crafting voluminous briefs outlining the law against retroactivity. 45
Less than one month after the law's enactment, a federal district court heard
arguments regarding the retroactive application of the new law in a race-
discrimination action in which the plaintiff sought damages and a jury trial even
though he filed suit before the effective date of the Act. 46 This case, however,
was merely the first raindrop in a downpour. Ultimately, cases seeking similar
guidance reached nearly every circuit court of appeals. All but one of the
circuits considering the issue concluded that the 1991 Act does not apply
retroactively.47 Recognizing the split among the circuits and the need for
clarification, the Supreme Court agreed to review two cases that rejected
42. See, e.g., Lavrov v. NCR Corp., 600 F. Supp. 923 (S.D. Ohio 1984) (relying on the four
factors to determine whether a foreign subsidiary and American parent were an integrated enterprise
in the context of a Title VII claim).
43. Pub. L. No. 102-166. 105 Stat. 1071, 1099 (1991).
44. King v. Shelby Medical Ctr.. 779 F. Stipp. 157. 158 (N.D. Ala. 1991).
45. See Jonathan Groner. New Rights Act Ducks Crucial Issues; Courts Left to Grope with How
Statute Affects Pending Cases, Legal Times, Dec. 9, 1991, at 1, 18.
46. Van Meter v. Barr, 778 F. Supp. 83 (D.D.C. 1991).
47. See Gersman v. Group Health Ass'n, Inc., 975 F.2d 886 (D.C. Cir. 1992); Landgraf v. USI
Film Prods., 968 F.2d 427 (5th Cir. 1992), cert. granted, 113 S. Ct. 1250 (1993); Vogel v. City of
Cincinnati, 959 F.2d 594 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. C1. 86 (1992); Mozee v. American
Commercial Marine Serv. Co., 963 F.2d 929 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S.Ct. 207 (1992); Fray v.
Omaha World Herald Co., 960 F.2d 1370 (8th Cir. 1992); Baynes v. AT&T Technologies, 976 F.2d
1370 (11 th Cir. 1992). Contra Estate of Reynolds v. Martin, 985 F.2d 470 (9th Cir. 1993).
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retroactive application of the 1991 Act."' The Court heard oral arguments in
September 1993 and, in April 1994, rendered decisions holding that, at least with
respect to Sections 101 and 102 of the Act, the statute may not be applied
retroactively to conduct or trials occurring before the statutes effective date."
The litigation controversy has not concerned only Section 402(a)'s general
effective date provision. Section 402(b) of the Act has also raised controversy;
indeed, due in part to the unusual exemption of this provision-"nothing in this
Act shall apply to any disparate impact case for which a complaint was filed
before March 1, 1975, and for which an initial decision was rendered after
October 30, 1983"-the "long and complex history" of the Wards Cove case
itself continues. On December 7, 1993, the Ninth Circuit determined the
constitutionality of Section 402(b), upholding it on three grounds. First, it
declared that the provision does not violate the separation-of-powers doctrine
because the exemption does not order "any federal court to dismiss the workers'
complaint, to enter judgment against them, or to make particular findings of fact
or conclusions of law."'', The court next rejected the workers' Fifth Amend-
ment challenge, finding that Congress had a rational basis for enacting the
exemption-namely that, because the suit already had expended significant
private and judicial resources and the Supreme Court's decision provided clear
standards for remand, Congress reasonably decided that the case would be
decided pursuant to those standards. " Finally, the court held that the provision
does not constitute an unlawful bill of attainder because Congress did not intend
to punish the workers by enacting it; it intended only to "relieve the canneries
from the cost of additional litigation."53
II. SCORING THE DEVELOPMENTS
While the data concerning developments under the Act is admittedly still
quite limited, it is possible to reach at least some preliminary conclusions
concerning the Act's scope and impact. Specifically, the "winners" and "losers"
of the acrimonious legislative battle that led to the statute's enactment may be
identified more accurately by the Act in action.
First, although there has been little dispute over the meaning and application
of Section 102's new damages and jury trial provisions, the effect of Section 102
has clearly been to promote a dramatic increase in the number of EEO charges
48. See Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 968 F.2d 427 (5th Cir. 1992), cert. granted, 113 S. Ct. 1250
(1993); Harvis v. Roadway Express, Inc., 973 F.2d 490 (6th Cir. 1992), cert. granted sub noa. Rivers
v. Roadway Express, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 1250 (1993).
49. Rivers v. Roadway Express, Inc.. No. 92-938 (decided April 26, 1994); Landgraf v. USI Film
Products, No. 92-757 (decided April 26, 1994) (see supra note *).
50. Atonio v. Wards Cove Packing Co., 10 F.3d 1485, 1489 (9th Cir. 1993).
51. Id. at 1492.
52. Id. at 1494.
53. Id. at 1496.
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filed and lawsuits pursued.' The authorization of jury trials, compensatory
damages, and punitive damages has greatly increased the stakes of adverse
employment actions against females and minorities and the visibility of civil
rights enforcement itself. As a consequence, individuals who previously would
not have sued are apparently suing, and plaintiffs' lawyers who previously would
not have been interested in Title VII litigation are apparently accepting such
cases much more frequently. Moreover, our practice experience indicates that
employers are increasing their investment in antidiscrimination prevention efforts
to avoid, where reasonably possible, the substantially increased costs associated
with Title VII litigation. While the caps on liability have no doubt moderated,
at the margin, the effect of these provisions (and, together with the IRS's ruling
on taxability of damages, facilitated settlement in many cases), the dramatic rise
in EEO charge filings and damages demands since the Act's enactment strongly
suggests that, contrary to its assurances, the Bush administration in fact failed to
defang what it had previously described as a "litigation monster."
Second, although it is too early to draw final conclusions about the meaning
and effect of Section 105 of the Act, the Eighth Circuit's decision in Bradley v.
Pizzaco of Nebraska, hIc.5 suggests that, in this regard too, the Bush adminis-
tration may have failed in its battle over the legislative standards to be applied
in disparate impact cases. In agreeing to Section 105, the administration
acknowledged that it was accepting a legislative shift of the burden of proof to
defendants, making "business necessity" and "job-related" affirmative defenses
to a disparate impact claim. But, the administration claimed still to have
prevented enactment of a "quota bill" by, among other things, warding off efforts
to require employers to show that practices causing disparate impact are, for
example, "indispensable" to their business and the performance of the employ-
ment in question. Yet, the Eighth Circuit in Pizzaco seems to have adopted
precisely such a standard. Thus, while other circuits and, most importantly, the
Supreme Court may ultimately take a different approach, at least at the end of
the first round of litigation about the meaning and effect of Section 105, the civil
rights groups and plaintiffs' lawyers who opposed the administration appear to
be ahead on points.
Third, regardless of what happens in future rounds of litigation concerning
the meaning and effect of Section 105, as a practical matter, the Civil Rights Act
of 1991 may ironically mark the beginning of the end for much disparate impact
litigation. It has long been recognized that the statistical proof that is used to
prove disparate impact can, in many circumstances, be used to attempt to prove
discriminatory intent.56 Nevertheless, prior to the enactment of the Civil Rights
Act, most statistics-based cases were brought as disparate impact cases for two
54. Livingston. suipra note 7, at 58.
55. 7 F.3d 795 (8th Cir. 1993).
56. See Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324. 97 S. Ct. 1843 (1977); Barbara L. Schlei &
Paul Grossman. Employment Discrimination Law 1288-1290, 1331 (2d ed. 1983).
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reasons. The first was because of a perception among government enforcement
agencies and plaintiffs' lawyers that "effect" is easier to prove than "intent."
The second was because of their perception that the rebuttal burden on the
defendant is more demanding in a disparate impact case than in a disparate
treatment or "pattern-and-practice" case. As noted above, however, after the
enactment of the 1991 Act, statistics-based cases tend now to be brought as
disparate treatment or pattern-and-practice cases rather than as disparate impact
cases, apparently because a jury trial is available in such cases (whereas it is not
available in disparate impact litigation), because nontaxable back-pay and
compensatory and punitive damages awards are available in such cases (whereas
only taxable back-pay awards are available in disparate impact litigation), and
because the statutory restrictions on disparate impact suits-such as the
requirement that each employment practice be challenged separately--do not
necessarily apply to disparate treatment or pattern-and-practice suits. If this trend
away from disparate impact litigation toward pattern-and-practice litigation
continues, any victories that the Bush administration ultimately may have won
in the debate over Section 105 will be pyrrhic ones at best.
Fourth, as the Ninth Circuit's decision in Officers for Justice5 7 illustrates,
while the Act does not directly alter the legal standards generally applicable to
affirmative action programs, the Act is going to generate litigation about the
legality of such programs. Section 106 clearly proscribes race-norming practices
that had previously been used-a clear victory for the Bush administration. And,
as one of us has elsewhere pointed out, 8 certain amendments made by the 1991
Act-including the new damages and jury trial provisions-arm opponents of
affirmative action in employment with substantial new weapons for challenging
such efforts. On the other hand, other provisions of the Act make it riskier and
more expensive for employers to take actions that are adverse to women and
minorities and, therefore, create substantial new incentives for employers to
institute and expand either formal or informal (e.g., surreptitious) affirmative
action efforts. 9 The developments in the two years since the Act's passage do
not yet provide a basis for assessing which provisions will have the greater
behavioral impact. Nonetheless, litigation is almost certain to come, and the
statute that promised not to affect affirmative action programs is clearly going
to do so. 60
Fifth, as noted above, the Supreme Court has held that the statute's provisions
are to be applied only prospectively. Moreover, in doing so, the Supreme Court
and, before it, the courts of appeals generally declined to place weight on
Democratic efforts to characterize the Act as "restorative" in nature--efforts that
the Bush administration strongly resisted and succeeded in having deleted from the
57. 979 F.2d 721 (9th Cir. 1992). cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1645 (1993).
58. Glen D. Nager, Affirnative Action After the Civil Rights Act of 1991: The Effects of a
"Neutral" Statute, 68 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1057. 1072-80 (1993).
59. Id. at 1081-88.
60. Id. at 1088-93.
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statute's language. The administration thus won the battle over the Act's effective
date provisions-and with it, arguably, the battle over the political characterization
of the Act and the Supreme Court decisions to which the Act was, in part, a
response.
Finally, in evaluating the Act in action, it is important to remember that
earlier versions of the Act proposed rather significant revisions to a number of
other provisions in the civil rights laws, including provisions relating to attorneys
fees, the use of Rule 68 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in employment
discrimination cases, and the statutes of limitations applicable to the filing of
EEO charges. While other proposals (such as Section 109) were passed without
objection from the Bush administration, the administration opposed these
revisions to the statute and succeeded in having them withdrawn. No fair
assessment of the political battle can be done without giving recognition to the
administration's successful opposition to these proposed provisions.
In sum, it is clear that protagonists on both sides of the legislative battle
compromised. Contrary to its claims, the Bush administration accepted
provisions that have indeed created a potential litigation monster; and, while it
is really too early to tell, the administration may in fact have accepted statutory
provisions that will encourage the very kinds of statistics-based lawsuits that it
claimed to have prevented. On the other hand, the administration successfully
opposed certain radical revisions to the civil rights enforcement scheme and, at
least for the near term, achieved limitations on the damages provisions that will
be a practical, albeit loose, rein on such cases. Moreover, it appears that the
administration won the battle over the statute's effective date provisions and,
along with it, the battle over whether the Act may properly be characterized as
merely "restorative" of prior law. In short, neither side appears completely to
have "won" this legislative battle, though liberal civil rights groups and
representatives of the plaintiffs' bar are, on balance, ahead on points.
II1. OVERLOADING THE SYSTEM
That neither side can properly, claim complete victory in this legislative
battle is, however, not the only proper comment that can be made about the
developments in law and practice that have occurred under this statute.
Appropriate comment can also be made about the lack of consideration given to,
or understanding of, the ability--or, more accurately, the inability--of the civil
rights enforcement system to cope with the legislative victories of each side.
First, it is clear that civil rights groups and representatives of the plaintiffs'
bar did not give adequate consideration to the effect that the availability of jury
trials and compensatory and punitive damages would have on the system of
enforcing civil rights. As noted above, the statute has contributed to a dramatic
increase in charge filings that has simply overwhelmed the EEOC. Despite the
resolution of over 71,000 charges during the past year, the agency still reports
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an inventory of approximately 73,000 charges. 6' Already overworked agency
officials, further taxed by inadequate support and even greater caseloads, are
simply unable to engage in thorough conciliation negotiations and, not
surprisingly, are less successful in achieving both voluntary compliance and
mediated resolutions of discrimination disputes. "By necessity, if not by choice,
litigation has become a primary means for resolving workplace employment
discrimination grievances."'62 While it is stating the obvious to predict that this
escalating litigation will result in similarly escalated costs and possibly in less
favorable outcomes for employers, the delays in dispute resolution also impede
claimants in their efforts to receive the fruits of their new rights. It may even
deter some potential claimants from pursuing their grievances. Indeed, to the
extent that the new remedial provisions dissuade employers from hiring
individuals who they perceive as. potential litigants or dampen enthusiasm for
voluntary affirmative action or oiher training programs,63 the new law in action
may deny its benefits to the very persons that its proponents intended to benefit.
Likewise, even if the civil rights groups and representatives of the plaintiffs'
bar prevail in their efforts to liberalize the acceptable uses of statistics in civil
rights cases, they have not adequately considered or addressed the inability of the
federal court system effectively to handle and process such massive cases. Even
where statistics are used to establish systemic discrimination, individualized
hearings are necessary on liability and damages issues. Such large, class-based
cases can take years to litigate and resolve. Indeed, in today's congested federal
court-system, litigation of such cases can, as the Wards Cove case illustrates,
drag out for over two decades. In such circumstances, it can fairly be said that
the 1991 Act may have created rights that, as a practical matter, are not
practicably enforceable under the existing system.
Concomitantly, even though the Bush administration and the management
defense bar may ultimately succeed in litigation over the meaning and effect of
Section 105, they still have not adequately accounted for the substantial pressures
that will impel employers toward both lawful and unlawful race- and gender-
conscious employment actions. Until the ambiguities are resolved, the legal
uncertainties that exist in this statute will themselves create strong pressure for
employers to use all available means-legal and illegal-to integrate their
workforces, eliminate relevant statistical disparities, and avoid the use of selection
practices or processes that adversely affect minorities and women. Indeed, as noted
above, even when the statutory ambiguities are resolved, considerable pressure for
race- and gender-conscious employment actions-lawful and unlawful-will
remain from the potential for "pattern-and-practice" and disparate treatment type
cases, with their attendant jury-trial rights and potential compensatory and punitive
61. Livingston, supra note 7, at 58.
62. Id.
63. See Taylor, supra note 2, at 27-28. See also John J. Donohue III & Peter Siegelman, The




damages awards. The civil rights enforcement system includes these uncertainties
and pressures, and the Bush administration simply did not adequately account for
them (or, more cynically, chose to ignore them).
Finally, neither of the protagonists adequately considered the cost of all of
the compromises that they chose to make on the statute's effective date
provision. No matter how the litigation about this issue was ultimately resolved,
it is clear that the legislative agreement to create purposeful ambiguity about the
statute's effective date imposed an enormous and unnecessary cost on the civil
rights enforcement system. As noted above, this issue produced exponentially
more litigation than any other issue under the statute-at considerable cost to
both the litigants and the federal courts. In a system that was overloaded to
begin with, this litigation burden was unconscionable.
IV. CONCLUSION
This article has sought to evaluate, by reference to the legal and practical
developments that have occurred under the Civil Rights Act of 1991 since its
enactment, who "won" and who "lost" in the acrimonious debate that preceded
and followed enactment of the statute. While it is too early to make an ultimate
determination, it appears that each of the legislative protagonists made significant
compromises and that neither can properly claim to be the legislative winner.
Moreover, even to the extent that a particular protagonist can claim victory on
a particular issue, it can do so only by continuing to ignore the practical inability
of the current civil rights enforcement system effectively to resolve statutory
ambiguities and process claims. Until the protagonists deal with these issues,
many of the persons for whom each of these protagonists respectively fought will
fail to realize the benefits that supposedly were gained for them in this legislative
battle.
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